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Abstract  In the present paper a proposal is formulated 
to improve the safety of existing and future nuclear reactors. 
The idea is based upon the introduction of a new safety 
barrier against the release of radioactivity generated by the 
fission chain process. The proposal aims at fixing bases for 
possible strengthening of current Nuclear Reactor Safety 
by combining the logical frameworks associated with the 
concepts As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA), 
Best-Estimate-Plus-Uncertainty (BEPU), Extended-Safety
-Margin (E-SM), Independent-Assessment (IA) and 
Emergency-Rescue-Team (ERT). The expected impact of 
the new barrier upon selected nuclear accidents is outlined. 
The cost for the implementation of the additional barrier is 
expected to be affordable from a financial viewpoint and to 
contribute to restoring the public confidence towards 
nuclear technology. 
Keywords  Nuclear Reactor Safety, Safety Barrier, 
Severe Accidents 
1. Introduction
Nuclear Reactor Safety (NRS) constitutes a 
well-established technology at the time of writing this 
paper. About five-hundred Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 
units have been operated since the demonstration of the 
capability to control the fission reaction in 1942 and the 
connection of nuclear fission driven electricity generator to 
the electrical grid in 1954, e.g. see [1]. A much larger 
number of reactors (a few thousands) have been 
constructed and successfully operated for purposes 
different from electricity production including research and 
production reactors as well as reactors used for marine 
propulsion. However, a) the number of NPP built and 
operated is far below the number envisaged by nuclear 
pioneers in the 50’s and far below a number consistent with 
the industrial growth, and b) accidents occurred, including 
a few catastrophic ones which severely impacted the 
exploitation of the technology. 
Two paradoxical situations can be identified for NRS 
nowadays: first, maturity (this is meant either 
design-and-operation-capabilities, or reliability-of-safety 
evaluations) and in terms of was achieved at a time when 
the number of NPP units commissioned-constructed per 
year sharply dropped mainly as a consequence of the 
accidents in Three Mile Island (TMI-2) and in Chernobyl; 
second, interest from industry in implementing research 
findings and new ideas after those events declined leading 
to a sort of misalignment between technological 
capabilities and implementation status. Furthermore, 
concepts and principles in NRS were proposed by those 
who developed the nuclear technology in the middle of the 
past century and since then are embedded into any step of 
the process leading to electricity production. Those 
concepts and principles were adopted by other 
technologies later on and, still today, appear unsurpassed. 
The implementation of those concepts and principles shall 
follow and did follow the progress in understanding and the 
development of new techniques. 
The Defense-in-Depth (DiD) which connects the 
principle of radioprotection with the design, the 
construction and the operational features of the nuclear 
reactors, can be taken as the imaginary skyline which 
drives the development of NRS. On the one hand, the 
Design Basis Accidents (DBA) have been introduced to 
demonstrate the robustness of DiD. On the other hand, 
safety functions, barriers and (even) calculated safety 
margins resulting from computational analyses, e.g. [2], 
constitute perceptible outcomes and provide a measure of 
the safety of current reactors, see ref. [3]. 
The established technological picture has been rusted (a) 
by the nuclear tragedies involving [now] conceivable 
accidents outside the DBA envelope, like Three Mile 
Island Unit 2, 1979, Chernobyl Unit 4, 1986 and 
Fukushima Units 1-4, 2011, and (b) in an elusive way by 
the evidence, collected in the last two or three decades, of 
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the weakness of what is still considered the safety barrier 
constituted by the clad of nuclear fuel rods.  
Thus, an ambitious proposal is outlined to overcome the 
occurrence of conceivable accidents and the expected 
failure of the fuel clad barrier following DBA: the 
description of an additional safety barrier constitutes the 
content and the target for the present paper. Methodologies 
and findings from researches are gathered to form the basis 
for the design of the additional barrier. 
As a preliminary disclaim, two topics which are 
marginally or not considered hereafter are: human factors 
as key part of NRS and global political and economic 
strategies in the world which have an inevitable impact 
upon the exploitation of nuclear technology, [4]. 
2. Motivation 
Focus is given hereafter to two technological 
motivations for the present study, i.e. in addition to the 
public un-trust toward nuclear technology and the policies 
of government which also affect the worldwide energy 
market. 
The former motivation is quite obvious: severe accidents 
like those occurred in Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and 
Fukushima are not tolerable. It is clear that zero-risk owing 
to the operation of NPP is impossible to attain, as well as 
zero-probability per year of core melt. However, an attempt 
shall be made to bring the probability of core melt to the 
value which corresponds to the probability of fall of a 
disruptive meteorite on the site or in the region of the NPP. 
Corresponding risk, involving the impact of radiation upon 
the hit region and the survived population shall be accepted. 
The following statements by concerned scientists, [5], may 
be taken as backing the present study:  
 “In such a dangerous world, a high priority must be 
placed on efforts aimed at upgrading and enhancing 
nuclear safety regulatory system. With effective 
nuclear regulatory system nuclear accident like the 
Fukushima can be prevented”. 
 “Upgrading and strengthening a nuclear regulatory 
system is not optional but imperative to prevent the 
next core meltdown”. 
 “A credible nuclear watchdog must be an independent 
agency …” [current situation not satisfactory]. 
The latter motivation derives from an overview of 
current understanding of nuclear fuel performance during 
nominal operation and following accidents part of DBA. 
The condition High-Burnup (HBU) and Beginning of Life 
(BOL) fuel shall be distinguished, although any distinction 
is fragile also because of the industry (NPP owner) 
tendency to attain HBU from any BOL situation. Let’s start 
the overview from the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (US NRC) ‘preliminary-draft’ Regulatory 
Guide (RG), [6], dealing with new maximum values of 
both Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) and Equivalent 
Cladding Reacted (ECR): the values for PCT and ECR, 
never changed (so far) since the issuing values, part of the 
10 CFR 50.46 in 1971, i.e. 2200 °F and 17% respectively; 
those values are now reduced to 2050 °F and linearly down 
to 2%, as a function of ‘pre-transient H2 content into the 
clad’. It may be noted that high H2 concentration in the 
clad can be associated not only with HBU. A few hundred 
papers in open literature deal with Nuclear Fuel Failure 
(NFF) or rupture analysis. A comprehensive and 
systematic review is far beyond the scope here; one may 
easily find that NFF constitutes a complex topic where 
several phenomena and parameters contribute [3-6]. 
Groups of NFF mechanisms can be distinguished like: 
 Ballooning in case of Loss of Coolant Accident 
(LOCA) including recently characterized fuel 
relocation and power increase in the relocation region. 
Experimental data (measured together with inside rod 
pressure as a function of time) show clad temperature 
values at burst as low as 500 °C – 600 °C. 
 (Inter Granular, IG) Stress Corrosion Cracking 
[(IG)SCC], inducing Pellet Clad Mechanical 
Interaction (PCMI), and Pellet Clad Interaction due to 
Stress Corrosion Cracking (PCI/SCC).  
 Oxide formation, typically larger in HBU situation, 
induces spalling, hydride formation and 
embrittlement: spalled fuel favors hydriding and clad 
embrittlement even at low burnup.  
The weakness of the barrier constituted by the clad is 
emphasized from recent (experimental and calculational 
evidence as discussed in [7], [8], [9] and [10]. 
3. The Elements of the Additional 
Barrier 
A summary interpretation of the NRS safety barriers, at 
the light of the discussion in the section above, can be 
derived from Fig. 1. More details are provided below.  
 
Figure 1.  A vision for safety barriers: existing NPP and looking into the 
future 
Starting from the irradiated nuclear fuel (red ellipse at 
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the center of the picture; the barrier sometimes associated 
with the pellet is neglected here), the following barriers are 
identified (red labels B1 to B5 in the figure): 
 The B1 deals with fuel and clad (basically clad, 
according to the assumption above) and is the barrier 
in relation to which the weakness is discussed in 
section 1. 
 The B2 is constituted by the pressure boundary for the 
primary circuit: this exists in all water-cooled 
reactors. 
 The B3, not usually recognized as a barrier in NRS 
technology: it is designed according to different 
philosophies and exists in all water-cooled reactors. 
This is constituted by the installed Engineered Safety 
Features (ESF) and, noticeably, includes the 
Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS).  
 The B4 is constituted by the containment and, 
including the ‘confinement’ installed in majority of 
VVER-440 and the common pressure building 
installed in one Canadian Deuterium Uranium 
(CANDU) NPP, exists in all water-cooled reactors. 
 The B5 is the additional ‘risk-informed - 
technological’ barrier which constitutes the topic of 
the proposal in the present paper. 
 Furthermore, the following notes apply: 
 The B1 and the B2 (clear blue in Fig. 1) are 
introduced according to design needs of reactors. 
 The B3, the B4 and the B5 (when available) are 
designed according to NRS needs. 
 The B5 is expected to substitute the B1 once B1 
weakness is (formally) recognized. 
 In relation to each barrier, further characterization is 
provided in Fig. 1 (upper right), e.g. including the 
attributes ‘mechanical’, ‘concrete’, ‘electronic’, etc. 
The additional barrier B5 is constituted by a combination 
of the following elements, which have a heterogeneous 
nature and role: the As Low As Reasonably Achievable 
(ALARA) principle, the Independent Assessment (IA) 
requirement, the Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty (BEPU) 
approach, the Extended Safety Margin (E-SM) concept and 
the Emergency Rescue Team (ERT), now a virtual reality. 
ALARA, IA, BEPU and E-SM are discussed in [11] with 
more details given in [2], [12] and [13] and ERT is 
introduced in [14]. The elements are shortly discussed in 
sections 3.1 and 3.2, distinguishing between ‘software’ and 
‘hardware’ and their combined role is outlined in section 
3.3. 
3.1. The ‘Software’ Elements 
ALARA, BEPU and IA constitute the software elements 
of B5.  
Namely, the correspondence between ALARA and 
BEPU has been identified at first [11], by noting that the 
best use of computational tools according with current 
understanding is consistent (or even a direct consequence) 
of the early established principle imposing the minimizing 
of the radiation impact upon the environment and the 
population.  
BEPU constitutes an approach which originally drove 
the application of thermal-hydraulics system codes into the 
licensing process of water-cooled reactors, e.g. [2] and [12]. 
Suitable procedures for Verification and Validation, for 
addressing the scaling issue, for demonstration of quality 
and calculation of uncertainty in code predictions and for 
suitable coupling of codes (e.g. neutron physics and 
thermal-hydraulics) are among the pillars of BEPU. 
The IA requirement, although established since the early 
developments of nuclear technology, later on became of 
difficult application owing to the increasing sophistication 
of NPP which implies (more) proprietary data needed for 
safety demonstration [13].  
3.2. The ‘Hardware’ Elements 
E-SM and ERT constitute the hardware elements of B5. 
Safety Margins (SM) are well known words in NRS: 
suitable safety margins must be demonstrated and are part 
of design, construction and operation of existing reactors. 
The acronym E-SM, [12], implies a substantial increase in 
the number of parameters which shall be at the origin of 
one independent SM, the combination of two or several SM 
to create a sort of macroscopic SM and an about two orders 
of magnitude increase of signals from any operating 
reactors. The last feature suggested to include E-SM 
among the new hardware needed to implement B5. 
The ERT consists of a group of highly trained and 
specialized rescuers, [14], who owns suitable machinery 
and equipment (helicopters, Diesel Generators, DG, etc.) 
and the access to each nuclear reactor installed within an 
assigned geographic region. Here, ‘access’ means: (a) 
availability of plugs to connect DG feed-pump delivery 
sides to primary and secondary circuits of reactor and to 
ensure cooling of even damaged core; ERT team should 
arrive at the concerned site within one-hour (i.e. a time 
span lower than the time needed for massive core melt), 
based on E-SM signals; (b) possibility to induce scram of 
the reactor from remote location (this capability is already 
available in some Countries in special Nuclear Center 
under the control of a Government regulatory Institution).  
3.3. A sketch for the Barrier 
The summary sketch of the elements which constitute 
B5 is given in Fig. 2: the B5 is proposed here in order ‘to 
substitute’ B1 which is found to be unsuited or weak 
according to recent studies. 
Let’s first substantiate the terms adopted for defining the 
B5 in Fig. 1: a risk-informed technological barrier, needing 
electronic / computational system, ERT supported. The 
words ‘risk-informed’ requires full consideration of 
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Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) techniques as well 
as integration of those techniques into the Integrated Risk 
Informed Decision Making (IRIDM) framework [15]. The 
word ‘technological’ reflects the need of consistency 
between the elements of the barrier and the technology 
growth including the database of knowledge (e.g. a new 
magnitude of earthquake in an assigned geographical 
region): the B5 shall be constantly upgraded. The word 
‘electronic’ gives the proper emphasis to: a) the 
consideration of Instrumentation and Control (I & C) into 
the safety analysis; b) the design, the installations and the 
operation of (an order of magnitude) 104 detectors for 
fulfilling the E-SM element needs. The word 
‘computational’ stresses the importance of analyses which 
are qualified and independent from the designer-owner of 
the reactor. The words ‘ERT supported’ emphasized the 
need for ERT: E-SM continuously monitors the NPP, the 
environment and the workers actions and solicit the 
intervention of ERT.  
 
Figure 2.  Summary sketch of elements which constitute the additional 
safety barrier (B5) 
The B5 safety barrier is a dynamic system tailored to 
each reactor, although design philosophy as well as 
procedures and databases are in common to all reactors.  
The concerned NPP Unit is the starting point for the 
design of B5 (top left in the diagram): the information 
database dealing with design, construction and operation of 
the reactor is relevant. The regulatory framework at the 
basis of the licensing of the Unit (i.e., the item ‘NRS 
requirements at the top of the diagram) shall form the 
second database needed to start the process for constituting 
the B5. ALARA is a driving principle in this connection.  
The role of Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), 
including any licensing document issued in relation to the 
NPP Unit is clarified as follows. A ‘standard’ FSAR, 
according to regulations is available for any existing Unit 
or is expected to be issued for new (future) built reactors. 
This is part of the second database mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. A new FSAR, independent of the first 
one and basically including the same information is 
expected to be created and to form a cross-cutting element 
for the B5: the new FSAR is called BEPU-FSAR, central 
element in the diagram; its cross-cutting nature is 
visualized by the dotted bounded ellipse on the central-left 
of the diagram. 
The BEPU techniques and/or approach (central element 
in the diagram), originally derived from nuclear 
thermal-hydraulics and applied for accident analysis, [11], 
are extended to cover any analytic parts of the (new) FSAR, 
[16], leading to the so called BEPU-FSAR (i.e. the ‘new’ 
FSAR). 
IA, left of the diagram, constitutes a requirement for the 
‘new’ FSAR. Independent assessors should have access to 
the NPP Unit design and licensing information (first and 
second database above mentioned) and develop the ‘new’ 
FSAR, [13]. Because of the proprietary nature of 
information in the databases, although independent 
assessors are not in competition with industry (either 
designer or owner of the NPP), the IA is expected as the 
critical element for the overall process. 
The E-SM set of safety margins and corresponding 
transducers on the field (central bottom of the diagram) can 
be determined by a specific procedure, [12], supported by 
the outcomes of BEPU-FSAR analyses. 
The ERT operation (bottom right of the diagram) is 
expected to be informed by the E-SM, i.e. horizontal arrow 
in the diagram.  
The combination of BEPU application (noticeably 
leading to BEPU-FSAR) and E-SM, driven by IA and 
under the umbrella of ALARA, with the support of ERT, 
forms the additional dynamic safety barrier (bottom of 
diagram).  
4. The Application of the Barrier  
A trivial (rough and approximate) use of the barrier 
during the course of the ‘historical’ severe accidents which 
hit the nuclear technology and an (again rough and 
approximate) evaluation of the cost are at the origin of the 
notes in the following subsections. 
A detailed thermal-hydraulic description of the Three 
Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima events can be 
found in [17], till the time when an irreversible (i.e. a 
situation in relation to which current technological 
capabilities to prevent further excursion of the event are 
challenged) core damage occurred. The provided 
information (not reported here) is the background for the 
notes related to the expected performance of the B5 in 
those cases.  
4.1. Three Mile Island Accident 
In case of the TMI-2 accident, B5 would have stopped 
(i.e. by generating a scram signal) the operation of the unit 
well before the event. The simultaneous closure of the 
manual Auxiliary Feed-Water (AFW) valve and the 
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combined failure which would have caused a red alarm 
from E-SM detectors. So the accident would have not even 
been triggered.  
ERT was not needed. 
4.2. Chernobyl Accident 
The conditions which caused and/or are the roots for the 
explosion came into place at least 24 hours before the event. 
A number of mismatches between measured parameter 
values and allowed parameter values occurred different 
times in this period. The issue was that the operators 
decided to ignore and /or were demanded to ignore those 
mismatches. A critical human factors problem occurred.  
ERT intervention became needed because of the 
repeated controversial actions by NPP operators. At first, a 
remote ERT controlled scram would have occurred. An 
ERT team, properly supported by Country Army should 
have intervened removing negligent operators. The 
Chernobyl accident would have not occurred.  
4.3. Fukushima Accidents 
Events in Fukushima Units 1 to 3 are considered here.  
The signal challenging the B5 in each of the three units 
would have been the earthquake: its magnitude above the 
design value would have caused scram (which actually 
happened during the event) and would have alerted ERT 
(clearly this did not happen).  
ERT intervention needed because of the severity of the 
earthquake and of the consequent tsunami (possible 
satellite-based measurement of the tsunami wave height 
should have contributed to the alert of the ERT team). 
Proper ERT action would have prevented extended core 
damage. 
4.4. Cost of the Additional Barrier  
Dealing with (absolute) cost of B5 imposes three 
preliminary notes, where values are given in US$: (a) the 
cost of one NPP Unit, typically 1000 Mwe size is in the 
range 5-10 Billion; (b) the cost for recovering from a 
severe accident including damage to land and to population 
(cases of Chernobyl and Fukushima) is in the order of 
magnitude of 1 Trillion; (c) the selling value of electricity 
produced in two-months operation of one Unit, this means 
1/300 time for the overall NPP life (assumed 60 years), is 
around 50 Million. 
The rough estimation for the cost of the additional 
‘dynamic’ barrier B5, design and operation gives: cost 
comparable with (c) value, around 1% of the (a) value; and 
around 0.005% of the (b) value. 
One may further elaborate on the cost of B5 by noting 
that X% of the total cost can be shared by many NPP units 
(e.g. databases, computational tools, skill of analysts, etc.) 
and Y% is the cost which applies to each ‘individual’ Unit. 
Typical values for X and Y can be 70 and 30, respectively.  
5. Conclusions 
The decline of nuclear technology, appearing 
irreversible so far mostly in the Countries where it was 
developed, and the assembling of recent research findings 
brought to the proposal for a new safety barrier for existing 
and new nuclear reactors. 
The unacceptability of severe accidents expected from 
the operation of NPP, the need to pursue in a rigorous way 
the independent assessment and the weaknesses, now 
evident, of the fuel clad as a barrier against the release of 
fission products, suggested the proposal for a 
resilient-dynamic additional safety barrier.  
The BEPU methodological approach pursued by 
independent assessors plus an extended-detailed 
monitoring of the plant status, plus the support in extreme 
situations by a NPP external rescue team, contribute to 
form the additional barrier which is expected: 
 to reduce the probability of core melt down to values 
which correspond to the fall on the reactor of a site 
damaging meteorite, 
 to reduce the current risk of large radioactivity release 
for a factor in the range 10 – 100, 
 to have the potential to contribute in restoring the 
public trust towards nuclear technology.  
Although selected pieces of the overall spectrum of 
activities for the new barrier are established achievements 
for the current technology, thorough investigations shall be 
planned to confirm the feasibility of the barrier. Namely, 
this applies in relation to a) the identification of parameters 
to be monitored which constitute a suitable set of E-SM, b) 
the demonstration of reduction of the core melt probability, 
and c) the confirmation of the availability of financial 
resources and competences to design and operate the 
barrier. A suitable solution for the IA should also be 
attained, possibly considering the proposal in a referenced 
paper (i.e. [13]). 
Finally, current safety culture including international 
institutions dealing with nuclear safety appears adequate 
and appropriate even for creating the framework for the 
present proposal. However, it shall be accepted that human 
factors in a broad sense, i.e. individuals initiating a war or 
planning a terroristic attack against a nuclear installation 
and the extreme natural event like the fall of a large 
meteorite on the site, put challenges to the release of fission 
products which cannot be confined or satisfactorily 
weakened by any safety barrier.  
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